Gjermund Haslerud

• Trondal, Jarle & Haslerud, Gjermund (2023). Bureaucratic bias in integrated administrative systems: A large-scale study of government officials. Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions. ISSN 0952-1895. 37(2), s. 475–495. doi: 10.1111/gove.12780. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Trondal, Jarle; Haslerud, Gjermund & Kuhn, Nadja Sophia Bekkelund (2020). The Robustness of National Agency Governance in Integrated Administrative Systems: Evidence from a large-scale study. Public Administration Review. ISSN 0033-3352. doi: 10.1111/puar.13309. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  This article examines government agencies facing choice architectures that are multiple, overlapping, ambiguous, and sometimes incompatible—in short: turbulent. It makes two contributions: First, two conceptual images of agency governance are outlined that derive distinct predictions on how agencies are likely to maneuver when embedded in integrated multilevel administrative orders. Secondly, benefitting from a large‐N dataset on agency officials (N = 1,963) from 47 government agencies, the study suggests that government agencies are primarily biased towards a pragmatist compound dynamic. Additionally, the analysis probes the robustness of these conceptual images by entering moderator variables into the analysis. Multiplicative interaction model analysis suggests that the compound dynamic of agency governance is robust because no moderator variables fundamentally transform relationships from one governance type to another.

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• Haslerud, Gjermund (2005). The Growth of Tax Havens: A Theoretical Perspective and an Empirical Analysis. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  This paper examines why states develop tax havens and what characteristics increase the probability of tax haven implementation. There is a lack of a conceptual framework and an explanatory model explicitly designed to explain why states establish tax havens. Existing definitions of tax havens are mainly used to describe an economical phenomenon. More specifically, the focus has been on the financial consolidation and not the political implementation. A common characteristic of most definitions is a lack of a political criterion. Therefore, lists of tax havens usually include a wide variety of political units like cities, associated areas and states. In this paper tax havens refer to states or jurisdictions with de facto tax autonomy, recognised by a specialised tax system based on the combination of low or no taxes and secrecy. This makes it possible to separate tax havens as tax systems or states, or even state formations, and tax havens as referring to tax privileges within a state’s more normal tax system. The main focus on tax havens has been on their function as intermediaries in the international financial markets. More than often tax havens are explained by exogenous models that simply view tax havens as by-products of growing taxes and intensifying regulations in the industrialized world. This paper seeks to complement the demand side perspective by focusing on the supply side, and thereby introduce an endogenous model that will be tested empirically by using logistic regression. As the model will show, tax haven development can be related to population size, colonial heritage and political regime.

• Haslerud, Gjermund (2004). Framveksten av skatteparadis. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Haslerud, Gjermund (2004). Tax Havens: Towards a Political Theory. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  This paper examines the development of tax havens. In the literature on tax havens there is a lack of a conceptual framework and an explanatory model explicitly designed to explain why states establish tax havens. Existing definitions of tax havens are mainly used to describe an economic phenomenon; a finance centre, and not a type or family of states. More specifically, the focus has been on the financial consolidation and not the political implementation. A common characteristic of most definitions is a lack of a political criterion. Therefore, lists of tax havens usually include a wide variety of political units like cities, associated areas and states. In this paper tax havens refer to states or jurisdictions with de facto tax autonomy, recognised by a specialised tax system based on the combination of low or no taxes and secrecy. This makes it possible to separate tax havens as tax systems or a type of states, or even state formations, and tax havens as referring to specific tax privileges within a state’s more normal tax system. The main theoretical approaches are explaining tax havens functionally as intermediaries in the international financial markets, and thereby, reducing the tax havens and their political authorities to instruments for global financial interests. As a consequence, tax havens are usually explained by exogenous models that simply view tax havens as by-products of growing taxes and regulations in the industrialized world. This paper seeks to complement this demand side perspective by focusing on the supply side; the political economy of tax havens. An endogenous explanatory model will be introduced and tested empirically by using statistical methods. As the model will show, tax haven developments are related to historical as well as institutional factors within the tax havens.

• Haslerud, Gjermund & Tranøy, Bent Sofus (2005). Fighting terrorist finance - Issues, Impacts and Challenges. Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt. ISSN 9788246409535. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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