Daniel Göller

Førsteamanuensis Institutt for økonomi

E-post: daniel.goller@uia.no
Telefon: +47 38 14 23 26
Kontor: 9I273 (Universitetsveien 19, 4630 Kristiansand, Norway)

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Ansvarsområder

Daniel Göller er førsteamanuensis ved Institutt for økonomi på Handelshøyskolen ved Universitetet i Agder. Han har en doktorgrad i økonomi fra Universitetet i Bonn (Tyskland).

Som forsker er Göllers hovedinteresser lov og økonomi, kontraktsteori og forhandlingsteori.Han har publisert en rekke artikler i internasjonale tidsskrifter, som for eksempel Journal of Economic Theory, American Law and Economics Review, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics og International Review of Law and Economics.Han er medlem av forskningsgruppen CNI, competition, networks and institutions. Göller er også referee for flere vitenskapelige tidsskrifter som Review of Economics studies, Journal of the European Economic Organization eller Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization.

Göller er medlem av studierådet og satt i fakultetsstyret. Han har gjort konsulentarbeid for Kristiansand Kommune og var ekspertrådgiver for EØS-mekanismeprosjektet "Regional convergence and social inclusion under technological change”. Han er Gründer og styremedlem i Victoria Hotel Krageræ ASGöller organiserer forskningsseminariet på Handelshøyskolen og underviser ulike økonomiske fag på både bachelor- og masternivå.

Göller har nylig evaluert skolens bachelorprogram som medlem av BAKØKAD-panelet.

Forskning

Faglige interesser

Research Interests:

Law and Economics

Contract Theory

Bargaining Theory

Institutional Economics

Presentations:

Norwegian School of Economics, University of Portsmouth

EEA-ESEM paralell meetings, American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics, European Association of Law and Economics Annual Meeting, German Association of Law and Economics Annual Meeting, Jahrestagung des Vereins für Sozialpolitik, Magdeburg

Teaching:

Quantitative Financial Economics, Fall 2014, 15, 16, UIA

Intermediate Microeconomics, Fall 2014, 15, 16, UIA

Advanced Microeconomics, Fall 2013, UIA

Institutional Economics, Spring 2013, Bonn

Law and Economics (as T.A.), Fall 2012, Bonn

Seminar on Scientific Writing & Contract Law, Spring 2012, Bonn

Law and Economics (as T.A.), Fall 2011, Bonn

Institutional Economics (as T.A.), Spring 2011, Bonn

Institutional Economics (as T.A.), Spring 2010, Bonn

Introduction to Microeconomics (as T.A.), Fall 2008, Bonn

Forskningsgrupper

Samfunnsøkonomi

Göller, Daniel (2026). How long-term contracts can mitigate inefficient renegotiation arising due to loss aversion. Review of Behavioral Economics. ISSN 2326-6198. doi: 10.1108/rbe-08-2025-0063. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag
Purpose This paper revisits Herweg and Schmidt (2015, henceforth H&S), where loss aversion can render renegotiation inefficient, and studies the implications of endogenizing enforcement when renegotiation fails. The goal is to understand how the disagreement outcome − and thus reference-point comparisons − changes when contract performance is not automatic, and what this implies for the relative performance of long-term contracts versus spot contracting. Design/methodology/approach I extend the H&S framework by introducing a date-3 enforcement/exercise decision: after failed renegotiation, parties may invoke enforcement or walk away to an outside option. I analyze specific performance and option contracts, solve by backward induction, characterize enforcement conditions, renegotiation feasibility and renegotiated prices, and compare contract forms, with robustness discussed for alternative reference-point timing/salience assumptions. Findings Allowing for non-enforcement alters the disagreement outcome and creates a behavioral trade-off: accepting a renegotiated proposal can involve losses relative to the original contract, while rejecting it may trigger losses when the disagreement outcome materializes. This can make renegotiation more likely to succeed under loss aversion and can improve long-term contracting in the environments studied, especially under option contracts that allocate enforcement rights unilaterally and make the price a more effective strategic instrument. Originality This paper introduces an endogenous enforcement/non-enforcement margin into a canonical loss-averse renegotiation model and shows how contract form shapes the disagreement outcome that anchors reference points. This mechanism − absent in H&S where disagreement entails automatic contract performance − can change renegotiation incentives and helps explain when option-like structures can outperform spot and benchmark specific performance contracts.
Landgärds, Ida Maria & Göller, Daniel (2024). Bridging mathematical and microeconomic perspectives: a praxeological analysis of the Lagrange multiplier method. Teaching Mathematics and its Applications. ISSN 0268-3679. 43(4), s. 314–337. doi: 10.1093/teamat/hrae020. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag
This article investigates the challenges that economics students face when they make the transition from service mathematics course(s) to microeconomics courses with a focus on how the concept of the Lagrange multiplier method is used in constrained utility maximization problems. The study aims to identify and understand discrepancies in the application of the Lagrange multiplier method as introduced in the mathematics course and subsequently applied within the microeconomics course. For this purpose, we conducted a comparative praxeological analysis of textbooks used in the two courses. The analysis reveals significant differences in the techniques and technologies used in both textbooks, which may cause difficulties for students in their transition between the courses. Additionally, the analysis revealed total mismatches in praxeologies within the textbooks. The article concludes with suggestions on topics for service mathematics teachers to address for aligning their instruction with the microeconomics application of the Lagrange multiplier method.
Andersson, Kjetil & Göller, Daniel (2021). Mobile Telephony in Emerging Markets:TheImportanceofDual-SIMPhones. Review of Network Economics. 19(3). doi: 10.1515/rne-2020-0040. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2019). Contract, Renegotiation, and Holdup: An Optimal Contract When Interim Renegotiation is Possible. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. ISSN 0932-4569. 175(4). doi: 10.1628/jite-2019-0033. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2016). Platform-Intermediated Trade with Uncertain Quality: Comment. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. ISSN 0932-4569. 172(1), s. 30–34. doi: 10.1628/093245616X14464471185991. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel & Hewer, Michael (2015). Breakdown in multilateral negotiations. Journal of Economic Theory. ISSN 0022-0531. 157, s. 478–484. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.013. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2014). Expectation damages and bilateral cooperative investments. American Law and Economics Review. ISSN 1465-7252. 16(2), s. 473–498. doi: 10.1093/aler/ahu002. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel & Alexander, Stremitzer (2014). Breach Remedies Inducing Hybrid Investments. International Review of Law and Economics. ISSN 0144-8188. 37, s. 26–38. doi: 10.1016/j.irle.2013.06.005. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel & Hewer, Michael (2014). Economic Analysis of Taking Rules: The Bilateral Investment Case. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. ISSN 0932-4569. 170(3), s. 520–536. doi: 10.1628/093245614X13958185385442. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2013). Status Quo Deference and Policy Choice under Ambiguity. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. ISSN 0932-4569. 169(1), s. 129–133. doi: 10.1628/093245613X660483. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

Se alle arbeider i NVA

Göller, Daniel & Landgärds-Tarvoll, Ida Maria (2026). AI Tutors for Mathematical Instructions in Economics Courses. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag
Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly integrated into higher education, yet its potential to serve as a mathematics tutor in economics remains underexplored. This study examines whether AI tools can improve students’ performance on mathematically demanding tasks in microeconomics. We conducted a randomized controlled trial comparing students who practiced mathematical tasks in an microeconomics class with AI support to those using traditional resources. Performance was assessed through a test under exam conditions without aids. Students in the AI-supported group achieved higher scores, indicating that structured AI integration can enhance short-term performance. Gains were consistent across gender and independent of prior mathematics achievement. This study offers a promising starting point for integrating AI tools as mathematics tutors in disciplines such as economics and highlights the need for longitudinal research to examine lasting effects.
Göller, Daniel (2026). AI Tutors for Mathematical Instructions in Economics Courses. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag
Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly integrated into higher education, yet its potential to serve as a mathematics tutor in economics remains underexplored. This study examines whether AI tools can improve students’ performance on mathematically demanding tasks in microeconomics. We conducted a randomized controlled trial comparing students who practiced mathematical tasks in an microeconomics class with AI support to those using traditional resources. Performance was assessed through a test under exam conditions without aids. Students in the AI-supported group achieved higher scores, indicating that structured AI integration can enhance short-term performance. Gains were consistent across gender and independent of prior mathematics achievement. This study offers a promising starting point for integrating AI tools as mathematics tutors in disciplines such as economics and highlights the need for longitudinal research to examine lasting effects.
Göller, Daniel (2025). AI Tutors for Mathematical Instructions in Economics Courses. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel & Landgärds-Tarvoll, Ida Maria (2025). AI Tutors for Mathematical Instructions in Economics Courses. doi: https:/inerme.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/inerme_2025_extended_abstracts.pdf. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel & Landgärds, Ida Maria (2024). Integrating Mathematics and Microeconomics teaching and learning through Praxeological Analysis of the Concept of Lagrange Multiplier Method. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2020). How Long-Term Contracts can Mitigate Inefficient Renegotiation Arising Due to Loss Aversion. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2018). Mobile telephony in emerging markets: the importance of dual-SIM phones. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2018). Mobile telephony in emerging markets: the importance of multi-simming customers. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2016). Legal methods from the perspective of law and economics. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2016). Mobile telephony in emerging markets: the importance of multi-simming customers. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2016). Mobile telephony in emerging markets: the importance of multi-simming customers. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2015). Contract, Renegotiation, and Holdup: When Should Messages be Sent? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2015). Platform-Intermediated Trade with Uncertain Quality: Comment. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2015). Mobile Telephony in Emerging Markets. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2015). Contract, Renegotiation, and Holdup: When Should Messages be Sent? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel & Hewer, Michael (2012). Economic Analysis of Taking Rules: The Bilateral Case. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2012). Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel & Hewer, Michael (2012). Economic Analysis of Taking Rules: The Bilateral Case. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2012). Status Quo Deference and Policy Choice under Ambiguity: Comment. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2012). Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel & Hewer, Michael (2011). Economic Analysis of Taking Rules: The Bilateral Case. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2011). Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel (2011). Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative Investments. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel & Hewer, Michael (2011). Economic Analysis of Taking Law: The Bilateral Case. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander (2010). Breach Remedies Inducing Hybrid Investments. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander (2009). Breach Remedies Inducing Hybrid Investments. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander (2009). Breach Remedies Inducing Hybrid Investments. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

Se alle arbeider i NVA

Publisert 16. apr. 2024 11:40 - Sist endret 8. okt. 2024 18:43