Jonathan Egeland

• Egeland, Jonathan; Kennair, Leif Edward Ottesen; Kleppestø, Thomas Haarklau & Bendixen, Mons (2026). Coalitional value mediates status allocation based on cognitive ability. Evolution and human behavior. ISSN 1090-5138. 47(6). doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2026.106983. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Human cognition is unique. Our large brains and advanced cognitive skills indicate intense selection following the divergence from other hominins. Theoretical models and empirical data from the last few decades suggest that human intelligence primarily serves a social function. However, explaining precisely how human cognition is adapted for navigating the complexities of social life has proved challenging. This preregistered study empirically examines the recently proposed Coalitional Intelligence Hypothesis, which posits that the behavioral effects of human intelligence evolved as reliable signals of coalitional value, facilitating adaptive reciprocal exchanges of status and cognitive-computational services. This study also introduces the first Norwegian translation of the International Cognitive Ability Resource 16-Item Sample Test (ICAR-16), which we developed for use as our cognitive ability measure. Analysing a new dyadic dataset using the actor-partner interdependence mediation model, we found that coalitional value, operationalized in terms of ability to coordinate a group, fully mediates status allocated based on cognitive ability. These findings provide initial empirical support for the Coalitional Intelligence Hypothesis.

• Egeland, Jonathan; Kennair, Leif Edward Ottesen & Kleppestø, Thomas Haarklau (2026). Coalitional Psychology and the Evolution of Intelligence. Evolution and human behavior. ISSN 1090-5138. 47(3). doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2026.106839. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  As evolutionary and behavioral scholars have long noted, humans are “uniquely unique,” partly due to our remarkable cognitive sophistication. Since Darwin, scientists have sought both proximate and ultimate explanations for how human thinking and information processing differ from those of other species, and why humans evolved such advanced cognitive skills. Research over the past few decades suggests that various aspects of human socioecology—such as large group sizes and intensified social competition driven by ecological dominance—have selected for greater intelligence. However, a clear account of how intelligence enables individuals to adaptively navigate the complex web of social interactions within human groups remains an unsatisfied desideratum. To address this issue, we synthesize insights from psychology, anthropology, cognitive science, and other evolutionarily informed fields to formulate the Coalitional Intelligence Hypothesis. This hypothesis posits that the behavioral manifestations of human intelligence function as honest signals of coalitional value, facilitating adaptive exchanges of status and cognitive–computational services. We derive five testable predictions from this hypothesis and evaluate them against core findings in the literature.

• Egeland, Jonathan (2025). Fishers Teorem om Naturlig Utvalg. Store Norske Leksikon (Nettutgaven). doi: https:/snl.no/Fishers_teorem_om_naturlig_utvalg. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2025). Cultural evolution and the beneficiary question. Evolution and human behavior. ISSN 1090-5138. 46(4). doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2025.106709. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  The ecological approach to culture extends the inclusive fitness tradition by proposing that cultural phenomena are best understood as extended phenotypes of producers aiming to maximize the replication of their genes. An important implication of this view is that cultural evolution can be modeled using traditional concepts from ecology, without positing a separate system of inheritance. This article presents a challenge to the ecological approach. If we take the gene's-eye view of evolution seriously, then we also have reason to believe that cultural phenomena may evolve by their own system of inheritance, since both positions are motivated by their ability to answer the beneficiary question from evolutionary biology.

• Egeland, Jonathan (2024). Mismatch Resistance and the Problem of Evolutionary Novelty. Biological Theory. ISSN 1555-5542. 19, p. 279–291. doi: 10.1007/s13752-024-00468-2. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  In evolutionary medicine and other related fields, the concept of evolutionary mismatch is used to explain phenomena whereby traits reduce in adaptive value and eventually become maladaptive as the environment changes. This article argues that there is a similar problem of persistent adaptivity—what has been called the problem of evolutionary novelty—and it introduces the concept of mismatch resistance in order to explain phenomena whereby traits retain their adaptive value in novel environments that are radically different from the organisms’ environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA). The possible role of variability selection in the evolution of mismatch-resistant traits is discussed, and it is suggested that mismatch resistance provides a useful tool for making progress on certain issues related to evolutionary theory, such as the modularity debate, cases of adaptivity outside of organisms’ ancestral environment, and the viability of naturalism as an overarching philosophical framework for understanding the natural world.

• Egeland, Jonathan (2024). Making sense of the modularity debate. New Ideas in Psychology. ISSN 0732-118X. 75. doi: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2024.101108. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2024). Imagination Cannot Generate Empirical Justification or Knowledge. Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy. ISSN 0165-0106. doi: 10.1007/s10670-024-00847-y. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2023). Heritability and Etiology: Heritability estimates can provide causally relevant information. Personality and Individual Differences. ISSN 0191-8869. 200. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2022.111896. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Can heritability estimates provide causal information? This paper argues for an affirmative answer: since a non-nil heritability estimate satisfies certain characteristic properties of causation (i.e., association, manipulability, and counterfactual dependence), it increases the probability that the relation between genotypic variance and phenotypic variance is (at least partly) causal. Contrary to earlier proposals in the literature, the argument does not assume the correctness of any particular conception of the nature of causation, rather focusing on properties that are characteristic of causal relationships. The argument is defended against Lewontin's (1974) locality objection and Kaplan and Turkheimer's (2021) recent critique of Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS).

• Egeland, Jonathan (2023). Ariadnetråden i Nietzsches Labyrint: Hvordan finne den «Virkelige Nietzsche». Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift. ISSN 0029-1943. 58(1), p. 20–30. doi: 10.18261/nft.58.1.3. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  I denne artikkelen argumenterer jeg for at det finnes indre retningslinjer i Nietzsches verk – en ariadnetråd – som viser hvilke av hans ideer og hvilke av hans verk som har eksegetisk fortrinn. Ved å følge disse retningslinjene forklarer jeg hvorfor den «virkelige Nietzsche» er å finne i Zarathustras tale, istedenfor i verkene hvor han formidler med «egen munn». Avslutningsvis sier jeg litt om hva slags filosofi – eller med andre ord, «hvilken Nietzsche» – vi sitter igjen med hvis vi velger å gi Slik Talte Zarathustra eksegetisk fortinn.

• Egeland, Jonathan (2022). Evolutionary Psychology and Normal Science: in Search of a Unifying Research Program. Integrative Psychological and Behavioural Science. ISSN 1932-4502. doi: 10.1007/s12124-022-09736-x. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Why are there so many controversies in evolutionary psychology? Using a couple of concepts from philosophy of science, this paper argues that evolutionary psychology has not reached the stage of mature, normal science, since it does not currently have a unifying research program that guides individual scientists working in the discipline. The argument goes against claims made by certain proponents and opponents of evolutionary psychology, and it is supported by discussion of several examples. The paper notes that just because evolutionary psychology has not reached the stage of normal science, the discipline is nevertheless a source of many progressive theoretical developments and interesting empirical discoveries.

• Egeland, Jonathan (2022). The ups and downs of intelligence: The co-occurrence model and its associated research program. Intelligence. ISSN 0160-2896. 92. doi: 10.1016/j.intell.2022.101643. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  This paper discusses the co-occurrence model and its associated research program, and it argues that the model provides the best supported theory of secular changes in cognitive ability. The co-occurrence model offers a better solution to Cattell's paradox (relative to the alternatives in the literature), and it is able to accommodate Flynn's four major paradoxes also. A review of empirical work conducted in order to test the model's predictions demonstrates that many populations in which selection favors lower intelligence have experienced a decline in g or some cognitive ability variable that correlates with g, at the same time that average phenotypic IQ has increased. Moreover, since the co-occurrence model makes predictions about variables that are not directly concerned with cognitive ability testing, its research program can be extended to other domains of research.

• Egeland, Jonathan (2022). Theories of Independent Intelligences as a Lakatosian Research Program. Philosophia. ISSN 0048-3893. p. 1–16. doi: 10.1007/s11406-022-00565-1. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2022). The Epistemology of Debunking Argumentation. The Philosophical Quarterly. ISSN 0031-8094. 72(4), p. 837–852. doi: 10.1093/pq/pqab074. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  There is an ever-growing literature on what exactly the condition or criterion is that enables some (but not all) debunking arguments to undermine our beliefs. In this paper, I develop a novel schema for debunking argumentation, arguing that debunking arguments generally have a simple and valid form, but that whether or not they are sound depends on the particular aetiological explanation which the debunker provides in order to motivate acceptance of the individual premises. The schema has three unique features: (1) it satisfies important desiderata for what any acceptable account of debunking would have to look like; (2) it is consistent with the inductively supported claim that there is no special debunking principle; and (3) it coheres with the plausible claim that what makes debunking arguments unique is that they rely on so-called genealogies for the justification of their premises.

• Egeland, Jonathan (2021). Scientific Evidence and the Internalism-Externalism Debate. Acta Analytica. ISSN 0353-5150. doi: 10.1007/s12136-021-00491-z. Full text in Research Archive Show summary

  Considerations of scientific evidence are often thought to provide externalism with the dialectical upper hand in the internalism–externalism debate. How so? A couple of reasons are forthcoming in the literature. (1) Williamson (2000) argues that the E = K thesis (in contrast to internalism) provides the best explanation for the fact that scientists appear to argue from premises about true propositions (or facts) that are common knowledge among the members of the scientific community. (2) Kelly (Philosophy Compass, 3 (5), 933–955, 2008; 2016) argues that only externalism is suited to account for the public character of scientific evidence. In this article, I respond to Williamson and Kelly’s arguments. First, I show that the E = K thesis isn’t supported by the way in which we talk about scientific evidence, and that it is unable to account for facts about what has been regarded as scientific evidence and as justified scientific belief in the history of science. Second, I argue that there are internalist views that can account for the publicity of scientific evidence, and that those views indeed do better in that regard than the (externalist) view proposed by Kelly. The upshot is that considerations of scientific evidence do not favor externalism over internalism.

• Egeland, Jonathan (2020). Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification. Episteme: A journal of individual and social epistemology. ISSN 1742-3600. doi: 10.1017/epi.2018.48. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2020). Against Overconfidence: Arguing for the Accessibility of Memorial Justification. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857. doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02604-4. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2020). The Problem with Trusting Unfamiliar Faculties: Accessibilism Defended. logos & episteme an international journal of epistemology. ISSN 2069-3052. doi: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011434. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2019). The demon that makes us go mental: Mentalism defended. Philosophical Studies. ISSN 0031-8116. 176(12), p. 3141–3158. doi: 10.1007/s11098-018-1167-7. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2019). Imagination Cannot Justify Empirical Belief. Episteme: A journal of individual and social epistemology. ISSN 1742-3600. doi: 10.1017/epi.2019.22. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2015). Metaontological Deflationism in the Aftermath of the Quine-Carnap Debate. Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 1019-8288. 29(2), p. 33–52. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2015). Metaontological deflationism in the Aftermath of the quine-carnap debate. Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 1019-8288. 29(2), p. 33–52. Full text in Research Archive

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• Egeland, Jonathan (2022). Larry Laudan. In Bolstad, Erik (Eds.), Store norske leksikon (snl.no 2022). Store norske leksikon. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2021). Inklings. In Bolstad, Erik (Eds.), Store norske leksikon (snl.no 2021). Store norske leksikon. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2021). Internalisme og Eksternalisme – Epistemologi. In Bolstad, Erik (Eds.), Store norske leksikon (snl.no 2021). Store norske leksikon. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2020). Debunking Isn't Bunk. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2019). Against Overconfidence. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2019). Debunking Isn't Bunk. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2019). Scientific Evidence and the Internalism-Externalism Distinction. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2019). Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2018). Accessibilism and Ideal Rationality. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2018). Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2018). The Demon That Makes Us Go Mental: Mentalism Defended. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2018). The Demon That Makes Us Go Mental: Mentalism Defended. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2018). Epistemic Internalism and the Basis of Justification. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2017). Representationalism and the Experience of Pain. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2015). Metaontological Deflationism in the Aftermath of the Quine-Carnap Debate. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2015). Metaontological Deflationism in the Aftermath of the Quine-Carnap Debate. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2015). Perspectivism and Interpretation in Nietzsche's Philosophy. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2020). Internalism and the Nature of Justification. Stockholm University. Full text in Research Archive
• Egeland, Jonathan (2018). The Importance of New Technologies for Modern Migrants. United Nations University Institute on Globalization, Culture and Mobility. Full text in Research Archive

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